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Introduction
I would like to explore with you today how Wittgenstein, in his later work 
The Philosophical Investigations, (Wittgenstein 2004 & 2009: henceforth ab-
breviated to PI) uses the dialectic method to engage with his readers and 
the role of conversion that is linked to dialectics. Wittgenstein is seeking to 
engage with interested readers for a purpose, and the dialectical method is 
a method that moves the reader from one understanding, which may in part 
be true, to a deeper one that is even more true. Wittgenstein was very aware 
that getting someone to change their mind is very difficult if one just asserts 
or writes something. This quote is from his notebook titled The Remarks on 
Frazer’s Golden Bough:
“To convince someone of what is true, it is not enough to state it; we must find the 
road from error to truth.’ (Wittgenstein: 2004 p1)
In this paper, I will attempt to mark out this road and hope that you will 
want to walk alongside me some of the ways.
Wittgenstein’s writing style
Wittgenstein’s deep, convoluted and intriguing writing has influenced many 
philosophers, however, the way Wittgenstein wrote, his style, has caused 
difficulties in achieving a clear conception of his philosophy. I suggest that 
misunderstandings exist because there has been an insufficient focus on his 
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use of the dialectic method with its links to philosophical conversion. To 
further explore this claim it is important to understand the background and 
context of Wittgenstein’s writing as I suggest many misunderstandings of 
his work, indeed his intention in doing philosophy itself is bound up with 
Wittgenstein not agreeing with how others around him were approaching 
philosophy. I argue that Wittgenstein should not be read as an analytic phi-
losopher but as a continental philosopher seeking to persuade those around 
him, the early founders of analytic philosophy, of a better and more fruitful 
way of doing philosophy.
General aims and background
Wittgenstein’s writing is usually divided between the early Wittgenstein 
and the later Wittgenstein. Some scholars trace the continuation of certain 
strands of thought between the early and the later and the discontinuation 
of other strands. Hacker ( Insight and Illusion p148), writing on the differ-
ences and similarities between Wittgenstein’s early and later conceptions 
of philosophy, writes that Wittgenstein broke decisively with the cognitive 
conception of philosophy that preceded and surrounded him. Hacker states 
that Wittgenstein in his later work ‘cuts himself lose even from the notion of 
ineffable metaphysics’ that he allowed in the Tractatus. Further, as Hacker 
explains, Wittgenstein thought that ‘philosophy really is an activity of clari-
fication’ and that it ‘can give other disciplines no foundation, since it is not 
concerned with uncovering fundamental true propositions upon which the 
sciences rest.’
Another conception which was a part of the philosophy at the time of 
Wittgenstein’s writing is that ‘the task of philosophy is ‘legislative’ or ‘stipula-
tive’. It should concern itself with devising an ideal language which will, for 
special purposes, be an improvement over ordinary language.’ Hacker (p150) 
writes that as early as the Tractatus, Wittgenstein contra Frege, Russell et 
al, repudiated the idea ‘that natural language might be “logically defective” 
as absurd, and the supposition that one might devise a “better” or “logically 
more perfect” language ridiculous.’ (Note the reference to Russell, under-
stood as the founder of analytic philosophy, which he spread throughout the 
UK and USA.) However, Wittgenstein’s later conception of philosophy went 
further, as Hacker writes, ‘The supposition that all possible languages have 
a common essential form is misguided since the concept of a language is a 
family resemblance concept.’
The concept of family resemblance proposed by Wittgenstein is a con-
cept used to allow for a loose grouping of items that bear a similarity like a 
nose or eyes in a family but which is not fixed or immutable. For now, it is 
important to note that his repudiation of a common essential form of lan-
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guages is based on his later approach to philosophy and the reasons given 
will also be found there. It is with this background in mind that what Witt-
genstein wrote in his later works can be understood. Such as: ‘Philosophy 
may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only 
describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as 
it is.’ This means that ‘we may not advance any kind of theory. There must 
not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with 
all explanation, and description alone must take its place.’ (PI109) Wittgen-
stein wanted to show the problems caused by language that has confused u s 
hence; ‘A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command 
a clear view of the use of our words.— Our grammar is lacking in this sort of 
perspicuity.’
It follows from what Hacker and others have written that Wittgenstein 
should therefore eschew the logical form or any a priori generalization that 
can be made in philosophy (PI 125) he felt that trying to advance any such 
generalization was a temptation that lures philosophers and should be 
avoided because it is this tendency that leads to more problems and dead 
ends (cf. PI 65ff and PI 109). The true task of philosophy was to avoid this; 
hence ‘What is your aim in philosophy? — To show the fly the way out of the 
fly–bottle.’(PI 309).
However, Wittgenstein was aware that he had to go further than point 
out errors: he had to find the source of the error:
‘We must begin with the mistake and transform it into to what is true.
 That is, we must uncover the source of the error; otherwise hearing what is true 
won’t help us. It cannot penetrate when something is taking its place.
 To convince someone of what is true, it is not enough to state it; we must find the 
road from error to truth.’ (Wittgenstein 2004)
To achieve this end Wittgenstein needed to find an approach to be ‘the 
road from error to truth.’ Let us turn now to Wittgenstein’s approach to phi-
losophy and its connection to his writing.
Wittgenstein’s approach and its connection to the text
Wittgenstein, in English at least, is generally considered to be difficult to 
read and is sometimes accused of being deliberately obscure. As Fergus Kerr 
(1997p.48) notes: “People accustomed to scanning the newspapers or who are 
philosophically trained to scent fallacies, have great difficulty in reading Witt-
genstein’s later writings.” However, as Marie McGinn in Wittgenstein and The 
Philosophical Investigations (1997) writes, Wittgenstein’s distinctive style is 
as it is for a reason:
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“It is Wittgenstein’s unique way of treating the topics he deals with that makes 
the Investigations so difficult to understand. It is not that his style is technical 
or abstract, rather that it is just not possible to see, in the style of the book, what 
Wittgenstein’s method is or how it is supposed to work. Yet understanding Witt-
genstein’s method and its connection with the form of the  text is the key to un-
derstanding the Investigations. This is so not because it is only by such means 
that we can know how to read the remarks that make up the work, but because 
Wittgenstein himself emphasizes over and over again that it is a method or a style 
of thought, rather than doctrines that characterizes his later philosophy.”
McGinn continues that confusion may exist because Wittgenstein also 
stresses repeatedly that he has no wish to put forward ‘any kind of theory’ (PI 
109) therefore readers have to approach The Philosophical Investigations in 
a different way from the usual one of reading and extracting a philosopher’s 
views. To try to understand what this approach consists of I propose that we 
look at the theme of therapy and what Wittgenstein himself writes regard-
ing his aim in philosophy which is perhaps more helpful than his summary 
given above ‘What is your aim in philosophy? — To show the fly the way out 
of the fly–bottle.’(PI 309)
Method and therapy
Wittgenstein noted that there was a difference between the questions posed 
by science and those posed by philosophy:
‘Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are ir-
resistibly tempted to ask and to answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads philosophers into complete 
darkness.’ (Wittgenstein BB p18).
It is this propensity to confuse ourselves by asking the wrong kind of 
questions which Wittgenstein sought to correct by offering an analysis of 
language and its use. ‘The confusions which occupy us arise when language 
is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work.’ (PI 132) Therefore Wittgen-
stein stressed to look and see how a word is used in practice rather than how 
any word can be theorized about. Moreover, Wittgenstein was not attempt-
ing to solve a single problem, rather he wanted to give an approach to phi-
losophy which would ‘give philosophy peace so that it is no longer tormented 
by questions itself brings into question.’ (PI 133). Wittgenstein distinguished 
between approaches which could solve one particular problem in philoso-
phy and his wider ranging approach where;
 ‘Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated) not a single problem.
(T)here is not a philosophical method, though there is indeed methods, like differ-
ent therapies.’ (PI 133)
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This does not mean that Wittgenstein thought that all philosophy to be 
therapy, rather the methods used in his approach to philosophy, like the dif-
ferent therapies in medicine, allow the symptoms (in this case philosophi-
cal confusion) to be relieved. The simile between the methods proposed by 
Wittgenstein to be used in philosophy to counter philosophical problems 
and therapies is apt, as the reader has to be engaged in the process for clarity 
to be gained. Marie McGinn summarises the process thus;
‘The concept of therapy emphasizes that Wittgenstein’s philosophical method 
aims to engage the reader in an active process of working on himself; it also un-
derlines the fact that the readers acknowledgment of Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of 
philosophical error is a vital part of his method, for “we can only convict someone 
else of a mistake if he acknowledges that this really is the expression of his feel-
ing”. McGinn (1997 p23)
The Dialectical Method
Clearly, if the reader is not actively engaged in the process nor accepts Witt-
genstein’s diagnosis then little change will occur with the philosophical 
problems encountered. This may account for why change does not always 
occur: there has to be a desire for the reader to want to go deeper into their 
own conceptual world. I would also say that this process will be uncomfort-
able and unsettling. One can perhaps understand why this conception of 
philosophy may want to be avoided by philosophers. However, this under-
standing is crucial: Wittgenstein does not want to solve one philosophical 
problem he wishes to change the way we think that causes us to create prob-
lems. To achieve this aim Wittgenstein uses a way of writing that engages his 
readers and which seeks to change the reader’s habitual way of thinking, the 
dialectical method. McGinn writes about a gradual acceptance;
‘Wittgenstein’s style and method in the PI are important in that they support his 
aim to ‘bring about a gradual acceptance of the fact that our attempts at explana-
tion are empty and that “since everything lies open to view there is nothing to be 
explained’ (PI 126). M. McGinn (1997 p29)
T he gradual acceptance, which McGinn refers to, is brought about 
through the dialectical process and it is through this process that Wittgen-
stein’s conception of philosophical method is revealed.
‘The dialectical structure of the work–seen in the interaction of Wittgenstein’s dif-
ferent voices–is thereby acknowledged as an essential part of his method and is 
not seen as a mere stylistic device which obscures the general views that are be-
ing surreptitiously advanced, and which our exposition must somehow draw out.’ 
(McGinn 1997 p29)
The gradual acceptance that McGinn refers to is a shift in our under-
standing of our world–view, our Weltanschauung. However, I suggest that 
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this change of perspective can at times be more dramatic. Furthermore, this 
change in Weltanschauung either gradual or dramatic is properly understood 
as a conversion. And it is in this sense that I use the term conversion from 
the Old French and the Latin meaning to ‘turn around’ and to see things from 
a different perspective. Wittgenstein states, what we once understood to be 
philosophical problems completely dissolve into thin air. We cannot ever 
step back into how we thought before the change occurred. The next quote 
from Wittgenstein illustrates this dramatic shift but also how the problems 
we once saw seem to disappear:
‘Grasping the difficulty in its depth is what is hard.
For if you interpret it in a shallow way the difficulty just remains. It has to be 
pulled out by the root; and that means, you have to start thinking about these 
things in a new way. The change is as decisive e.g. as that from the alchemical to 
the chemical way of thinking.
The new way of thinking is so hard to establish.
Once the new way of thinking is established the old problems disappear; indeed 
it becomes hard to recapture them. For they are embedded in the way we express 
ourselves; if we clothe ourselves in a new form of expression, the old problems 
are discarded along with the old garment.’ (Wittgenstein Culture and Value 55e)
Wittgenstein’s approach is not a shallow form of philosophical brain-
washing or a philosophical system that allows disciples to quote verbatim 
the master’s prose without a deeper understanding. Wittgenstein wants to 
engage in a dialectical approach with his reader to help them to see what the 
limitations are of their current way of thinking and to offer a new perspective 
a deeper conception  of philosophy, this is ‘the road from error to truth’ that 
Wittgenstein sought for at the beginning to his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden 
Bough. Therefore it is clear that his methodology must follow his aim, which 
is why The Philosophical Investigations should be read from beginning to 
end like a novel rather than as is usually the case in academia of removing 
sections of text to examine alone.
I propose to now turn to Wittgenstein’s methodology quoted in part 
above PI 133 which can now be read with the above in mind:
‘It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words 
in–unheard–ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply 
means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philoso-
phy when I want to. The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer 
tormented by questions which itself brings into question. Instead, we can now 
demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can be broken off. 
Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
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There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods like differ-
ent therapies.’
So Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy as stated in The Philosophical 
Investigations is to use dialectics to engage at a deep level with his readers to 
enable them to find and walk ‘the road from error to truth’. Let us now turn 
to a deeper investigation of dialectics itself.
Dialectics
Dialectics has a long history and any definition of dialectics or, the dialecti-
cal method will include the Socratic method, as well as Hegelian, Marxist, 
Talmudic Medieval, Hindu and Buddhist. I will focus on the ancient Greek 
Socratic method used by Plato in the Socratic dialogues as it would make 
sense to assume that Wittgenstein in his youth would have studied classical 
and ancient Greek philosophy. 
 In brief, “Dialectic or dialectics (Greek: διαλεκτική, dialektikḗ), also known 
as the dialectical method, is a discourse between two or more people hold-
ing different points of view about a subject but wishing to establish the truth 
through reasoned arguments.” Wikipedia 
(Note: It is difficult to find references to Dialectic in English, I will sug-
gest reasons later for this, but for now please excuse me having to use Wiki-
pedia.) 
Dialectics, however, must be differentiated from the dialogue, as Dialec-
tics seeks to establish the truth. It is not debated as there are no winners or 
losers, nor is the term synonymous with rhetoric which seeks to persuade 
an audience and can rely on mere sophistry: an argument that may or may 
not contain truths but its aim is to win by any means including playing fast 
and loose with truths.
The entry contrasts Socrates method with that of the Sophists:
“The Sophists taught aretē (ἀρετή, quality, excellence) as the highest value and the 
determinant of one’s actions in life. The Sophists taught artistic quality in oratory 
(motivation via speech) as a manner of demonstrating one’s aretē. Oratory was 
taught as an art form, used to please and to influence other people via excellent 
speech; nonetheless, the Sophists taught the pupil to seek aretē in all endeavours, 
not solely in oratory.
Socrates favoured truth as the highest value, proposing that it could be discovered 
through reason and logic in discussion: ergo, dialectic. Socrates valued rationality 
(appealing to logic, not emotion) as the proper means for persuasion, the discov-
ery of truth, and the determinant for one’s actions. To Socrates, truth, not aretē, 
was the greater good, and each person should, above all else, seek truth to guide 
one’s life. Therefore, Socrates opposed the Sophists and their teaching of rhetoric 
as art and as emotional oratory requiring neither logic nor proof.”
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“For example, dialectically occurs between Socrates, the Sophist, Gorgias, and 
two men, Polus and Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias. Because Socrates’ ultimate goal 
was to reach true knowledge, he was even willing to change his own views in 
order to arrive at the truth.” I would also suggest that the same happens in other 
dialogues like the Phaedrus. This has caused many commentators to misread 
Plato and fail to understand the person of Socrates, especially his willingness to 
change his mind, to be converted to another point of view. 
There are a few key points  that I want us to consider from the general 
definition above and the more specific Socratic form of dialectics:
1  Truth and the establishment of truth is the main goal;
2  Dialectic includes two or more people with as many (or more) differ-
ent views;
3  Dialectic begins by using contradiction as a starting point, rather 
than as a dead end, for contemplation.
4  It is often contrasted with the method favoured by Socrates philo-
sophical foes the Sophists in that they would use emotional appeal 
and rhetoric to win the bout and to impress upon their followers 
their point of view.
Another part of the Socratic method is Elenchus
“Elenchus is a form of a cooperative argumentative dialogue between individu-
als, based on asking and answering questions to stimulate critical thinking and 
to draw out ideas and underlying presumptions. It is a dialectical method, often 
involving a discussion in which the defence of one point of view is questioned; one 
participant may lead another to contradict themselves in some way, thus weak-
ening the defender’s point. This method is introduced by Socrates in Plato’s The-
aetetus as midwifery (maieutics) because it is employed to bring out definitions 
implicit in the interlocutors’ beliefs, or to help them further their understanding.”
I agree with Marie McGinn that Wittgenstein based his approach on the 
dialectic method, but I go further. The dialectical method is an interesting 
method to use because of its intention to deepen understanding even, as we 
shall see with the example of Socrates if that means that you change your 
mind. Also, I believe that Elenchus the form of a cooperative dialogue be-
tween philosophers is also at play in Wittgenstein’s PI.
I suggest that the above is a good background to understand what Witt-
genstein was attempting to do in The PI. Why has this not been noticed 
before?
 Criticism of dialectic and Weltanschauung
Now to me, this all sounds like a very good way of proceeding in philosophy. 
I accept that truth is my goal and that others may have different points of 
view and that by calmly and reasonably discussing these points of view we 
may change our minds and/or deepen our understanding. This may have 
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something to do with my being able to step into two Weltanschauungs, my 
parents were French and I read French fluently: indeed I have had to learn 
to navigate the English world–view consciously. I think Wittgenstein had to 
learn to do this, too.
However, others are not so happy with this conception of philosophy: 
indeed it has been suggested that some of the hostility which has divided 
Anglo–American philosophy from the so–called ‘continental’ tradition for 
most of the 20th Century has been because of dialectic. As I remarked ear-
lier, I could find no entry on Dialectics in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy or in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy and turn to print not 
in my older Philosophy dictionary published by Oxford University. And yet 
it is central to the Ancient Greek, Mediaeval and European/continental tra-
ditions. I would appreciate your thoughts on this matter at the end of my 
paper.
A few philosophers have attempted to bridge this divide, and if you en-
joy the philosophy of G.H. von Wright, Paul Ricœur, Hans–Georg Gadamer, 
Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor then you stand with them. I, as a student of 
philosophy in the UK, have not been aware of this method until brought 
to my notice by studying Wittgenstein and finding Marie McGinn’s book 
“Wittgenstein and The Philosophical Investigations”. However, in the latest 
edition of the PI, Hacker confronts head–on discussion about Wittgenstein’s 
use of the dialectic by saying it “has been overplayed”. My own study of 
Wittgenstein has revealed to me that many misunderstandings of Wittgen-
stein’s work in the English language are not just problems of translation, 
though these exist, but more fundamental are the enormous differences be-
tween individual traditions Weltanschauung or world–view. But this works 
both ways. I think that Wittgenstein was moved to write philosophy exactly 
because he was acutely aware of the two different ways of approaching phi-
losophy, the English one of his time and the European one in which he had 
been born and taught and studied. I suggest he did not agree with the philos-
ophers around him at Cambridge, GE Moore and Bertrand Russell and oth-
ers he met including Karl Popper. It was the comprehension that they saw 
problems in philosophy so differently from him that caused him to begin 
to attempt to formulate an approach that would give rapprochement to the 
two different perspectives. In this respect, I suggest that The Philosophical 
Investigations is like a Trojan horse stealthily smuggling into the constricted 
English world–view of 20th–century philosophy a deeper more enriching 
conception of philosophy, one that you on the continent may not have lost.
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